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WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1953
beaver, deer, and elk was apparently found too harsh. The claimant
now has ninety days within which to file his claim with the Game De-
partment."
IVAN C. RUTLEDGE
10 L. 1953, c. 127.
TAXATION
Of the fourteen acts which relate directly to taxation four are pri-
marily administrative in nature, one2 repeals an obsolete statute relat-
ing to property tax rebates, one' provides additional exemptions from
county real estate sales tax, and one4 provides more favorable treat-
ment with respect to the taxation of extractors of copra. Of somewhat
broader significance from a fiscal standpoint is the act5 providing for
reallocation of property tax millages under the forty-mill limitation law,
and the act8 relating to the number of electors required in special school
elections held prior to November, 1954. The latter act has been the
subject of recent press comment and litigation has been threatened be-
cause of uncertainty as to which "general election" is meant under the
language of the act.
Of greatest significance from the standpoint of revenue is chapter
91 which extends until April 30, 1955, the "temporary" increase in the
rates of business and occupation, public utilities and liquor taxes and
applies the retail sales tax to the furnishing of lodging and similar serv-
ices.
Among the enactments which received little, if any, attention in the
press are several relating to inheritance and gift taxes. While the
changes here made will have impact in only a limited number of cases
the effect may be substantial in a situation to which the amendment ap-
plies.
Chapter 136 relates to inheritance tax. It establishes a new method
for the evaluation of annuities, life estates, terms of years and the re-
mainders expectant upon such present interests. The actuaries com-
bined experience tables on the basis of four per cent annual interest
1 L. 1953, c. 150, c. 151, c. 157 (each of which relates to motor vehicle tax enforce-
ment), c. 240 (relating to cigarette tax). Chapter 94, § 2, also pertains to admmistra-
tive procedure (allocation of funds collected) under the real estate sales tax.
2 L. 1953, c. 103.
3 L. 1953, c. 94, §1.
4 L. 1953, c. 195.
5L. 1953, c. 175.6 L. 1953, c. 189.
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is abandoned in favor of the mortality tables required by law for use
by life insurance companies in determining values under ordinary life
insurance policies, with interest computed at three and one-half per
cent per annum. Under this act the tax commission is also permitted
to accept security other than a surety company bond when the payment
of inheritance tax upon a remainder is postponed until the time that
such interest becomes possessory
Chapters 138 and 139, which relate respectively to inheritance tax
exemptions and the gift tax exemptions, are similar in effect. The major
change effected in each is a redefinition of the persons constituting class
A beneficiaries and donees within the meaning of the two tax statutes.
As amended the categories of persons included in the class are the
same in each statute.
The effect of the two acts is to enlarge the categories of related per-
sons included within class A. The words "lineal ancestors" are substi-
tuted for the present reference to parents and grandparents, thus en-
larging the class to include ancestors in the third and more remote de-
grees. The "lineal descendants of a stepchild" and the "adopted child
of a lineal descendant" are also added to the class. The words "lineal
descendant" are changed in position and the unnecessary reference to
"child" is deleted. Otherwise the members of the class remain as in the
former law
Another change is made in the placement of one clause in the inher-
itance tax provision relating to exemptions." The words "which allow-
ance shall include all allowances in lieu of homestead and all family
allowances in excess of one thousand dollars" are shifted from their
former position in clause (A-i), which provides an exemption of $5,000
for the class, and are appended to the final sentence of the paragraph,
which states that "All of the amounts specified in A-i, A-2 and A-3
shall be allowed as exemptions to class A as a whole and not to the
persons mentioned therein." The reason for this change in position is
not readily apparent, as the clause itself seems to have no particular
relevance in either place. It would seem that in its original position it
was merely window-dressing, an apparent attempt to justify the exist-
ence of the blanket exemption of $5,000 accorded to the class under
(A-i) In its new position it lacks even that significance. Excision of
the clause would seem to have been the better procedure, as this would
have avoided the possibility of claim that the clause has some signifi-
7 RCW 83.08.020 [Rem. Supp. 1943 §11202].
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cance in fixing the amount of the exemptions which are allowable under
this section.
Chapter 137 relates to inheritance tax. It is a revision of RCW
83.16.070 [RRS § 11202a] which provides exemption from inheritance
tax on account of property previously taxed.
The former provision allowed an "exemption" of the value of any
property which was included, and subjected to inheritance tax, in the
estate of a prior decedent (who died within five years of the present
decedent) whenever such property is included in the estate of the pres-
ent decedent. The amount of the exemption was the value of the prop-
erty in the estate of the prior decedent, excluding any increment in
value between the dates of the two deaths.
The new provision allows an exemption of a portion only of the value
of the property previously taxed. In so doing this state follows the fed-
eral estate tax statute which requires a proportionate reduction of the
deduction allowed under the federal law with respect to property pre-
viously taxed.8
Under the former state provision the property previously taxed was,
in effect, treated as though it were completely separate and apart from
the other assets comprising the estate of the present decedent. Even
though claims and other charges are deductible in determining the
property taxable in the estate of the present decedent and even though
class exemptions are allowed in the estate of the present decedent, as
they were in the estate of the prior decedent, the exemption for property
previously taxed was allowed to the full extent of the value of the
property at the time it was included in the estate of the prior decedent.
The theory of the federal estate tax statutes as well as of the new state
provision is that such full allowance improperly affords a double deduc-
tion; and that the deduction or exemption of property previously taxed
should be allowed in proportion only to the property which is taxable,
taking into consideration deductions allowable and the specific or class
exemptions granted.
Having accepted the general philosophy of the federal estate tax
statute the new state law falls, however, to follow the pattern of the
federal law in determining the amount by which the exemption shall be
reduced. The federal statute and regulations pertaining to the deduc-
tion for property previously taxed are undoubtedly as complex as any
in the estate tax law. Few are the lawyers, even of the Philadelphia
8I T. REv. CODE § 812 (c).
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variety, who can read and readily understand the provisions of INT.
REV CODE § 812 (c) The federal statutory provisions, however, have
been worked out after careful study by both the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the expert staff of the Congressional committees. The fact
that a fairly acceptable, even though complex, scheme has been evolved
at that level would seem to justify as close adherence as possible to the
federal pattern when the general theory of the federal statute is adopted
at the state level. But instead of following the federal pattern the new
state law injects a new factor into its formula. "the proportion of de-
ductions chargable and any exemptions allowed against the property
previously taxed in the estate of the prior decedent" [italics supplied]
must be taken into consideration. Under the federal law, as complex as
it is, only the claims and exemptions in the estate of the present deced-
ent are taken into consideration in arriving at the proportionate reduc-
tions. But the new Washington rule requires that claims and exemptions
in the estate of the prior decedent as well as deductions chargeable
against the property previously taxed in the estate of the present de-
cedent be taken into consideration. The new statute states that the
proportionate reduction, in accord with statutory standards, "shall be
determined under the rules prescribed by the tax commission." If the
tax commission, under a statute which requires consideration of such
factors, can provide a formula which can be readily understood and
applied, most persons who have had occasion to struggle with the fed-
eral statute and regulations relative to property previously taxed will
be duly amazed. However, as the new state provision was undoubtedly
enacted with the approval of the commission, it must be assumed that
the commission will provide a formula which will resolve doubts on
this score.
The established policy in this state has been to limit the exemption
for property previously taxed to those cases in which the relationship
between both (a) the prior decedent and the present and (b) the pres-
ent decedent and the persons taking from the present decedent are in
close relationship by blood or marriage. Unless the statutory relation-
ship exists between both (a) prior-present decedents and (b) present
decedent-takers, the state law denies exemption for property previously
taxed. This is true under both the former and the new provision, al-
(AUGUST
WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1953
though no such limitation exists under the federal estate tax statute.9
The new statute clears up some ambiguities which existed under the
former provision and clearly specifies that the relationship in both in-
stances must be those specified in the case of class A exemptions.
Like the former statute the new provision does not afford an exemp-
tion for property upon which a gift tax has been paid by decedent's
donor within the five-year period prior to the present decedent's death.
The federal law applies the deduction to both types of cases. The avoid-
ance of double taxation within a period of five years is the reason for
allowing the exemption for property previously taxed. Whether the
previous tax is imposed under the state inheritance tax statute or under
the state gift tax statute would seem to be immaterial. Here, again,
there seems to be no substantial reason for failing to follow the pattern
of the federal estate tax law.
ALFRED HARSH
OThe difference in this respect between state and federal laws stems from the fact
that the state imposes a classified inheritance tax whereas the federal tax is an estate
tax levied without reference to the relationship between the decedent and those who
take from him.
TORTS
Survival of Actions-Death of Tort-Feasor. This Act represents
a long overdue attempt to reform a particularly barbarous segment of
the law by providing for the survival of causes of action for bodily in-
juries, property damage, or wrongful death against the deceased tort
feasor. It is not entirely clear that it will succeed; in 1869 a statute was
passed saying that "all causes of action.., by one person against an-
other, whether arising on contract or otherwise, survive to the personal
representative of the former and against the personal representative
of the latter." One would suppose that nothing could be clearer-that
the legislature could have done nothing more than to add the phrase
"and we mean it"--but by that strange alchemy which courts occa-
sionally practice the statute was transmuted to read "all causes of ac-
tion which survive at common law.., survive,"' thereby furnishing
as neat an example of judicial legislation as can readily be brought to
mind. Nor was it in a good cause, or for justifiable ends; the origin and
limits of the common law scheme of survival are not only wrapped in
I RCW 420.040 ERRS §9671.2 Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros., 4 Wash. 783, 31 Pac. 329 (1892).
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